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This brief Article, written in connection with a Symposium
hosted by the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology
Law, addresses nascent criminal enforcement against contributory
copyright infringement in connection with P2P file sharing. Using
Judge Posner's analysis in the Aimster case as a lens, it discusses
recent cases in Japan and Sweden. This Article contends that
criminalization involves an inherent uncertainty involving an
innovator's knowledge of, and intent for, the future uses of the platform
by others. Despite the difficulty of this task, since Japan and the E. U.
have seen criminal prosecutions brought against contributory
infringers, it should not evoke much surprise that the U.S. music
industry is seeking similar sanctions. However, criminalizing
contributory infringement to sanction P2P may bring criminal
punishment to bear on innovators with unclear overall effects.
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More than a decade after A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,1 it
seems fair to ask whether battles over peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing
will ever end. At times, the entertainment industry seems embroiled
in a game of Whac-A-Mole: Each time the industry uses litigation to
shutter a new "-ster"-Napster, Aimster, Grokster-a new P2P
platforms seems to pop up.2 In addition to litigating against the users
themselves,3 industry representatives increasingly call for criminal
sanctions against the innovators of P2P platforms.4 Indeed, such calls
came from music industry representatives at the symposium where
the author presented this paper.5
Given the nascent stage of criminal copyright law enforcement
against P2P sharing, this Article is necessarily brief. Criminalizing
contributory infringement to sanction P2P may bring criminal
punishment to bear on innovators with unclear overall effects. This
Article contends that criminalization involves an inherent uncertainty
involving an innovator's knowledge of, and intent for, the future uses
of the platform by others. Despite the difficulty of this task, since
Japan and the E.U. have seen criminal prosecutions brought against
contributory infringers, the U.S. music industry seeking similar
sanctions should not evoke much surprise.
Understandable frustration at seemingly endless civil litigation
no doubt drives those whose livelihoods are threatened by P2P sharing
to seek Draconian legal sanctions. However, fear and frustration
should not drive legal policy choices, particularly when important
competing interests are at stake. Others have admirably described
and debated in detail the complex dynamics of IP rights holders, rent-
seeking politicians and innovators - as well as the public.6 Instead,
1. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. See Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Towards the Digital Music Distribution Age: Business
Model Adjustments and Legislative Proposals to Improve Legal Downloading Services and
Counter Piracy, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 503, 504 (2006) ("[N]ew illegal P2Psites will
inevitably emerge, domestically or abroad, to replace the latest dismantled [site] and provide
consumers access to illegal downloads.").
3. E.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010);
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010).
4. See, e.g., Prosecutor, Hollywood Demand Prison for Pirate Bay Crew, WIRED, Mar.
2, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/tag/pirate-bay-trial (last visited Apr. 17,
2011).
5. Symposium, Where Do We Go From Here? The Evolution of Entertainment Law and
Industry in the New World, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695 (2011). The symposium was
graciously co-hosted by the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
and the music industry organization Leadership Music. See id.
6. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 205-06 (2008) (discussing industry pressure on lawmaking and calling for use of empirical
evidence as an alternative); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
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this Article focuses on Japan v. Kaneko ("the Winny case")', in which
Japanese judges struggled with precisely this problem, and explains
why imposing criminal sanctions on P2P architects is unlikely to solve
the problem.8  Given the difficult questions about intent and
knowledge of others' use, criminalization seems a poor fit for dealing
with P2P file sharing, regardless of the increasing frustration of
content industries.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the
inherent problem of determining intent and knowledge in the context
of contributory infringement. Part II examines the Japanese
prosecution of the creator of the Winny P2P software; Part III
analyzes the Swedish prosecution of the Pirate Bay.
I. OF JUDGE POSNER, SLINKY DRESSES, AND "MASSAGE PARLORS"
From the demise of Napster, the architecture of each new
iteration of P2P program has reflected an attempt to skirt the legal
concerns that brought down its predecessor. The demise of Napster's
anonymous P2P file sharing, with a centralized index server, begat
AlMster's decentralized P2P model, by piggybacking on AOL Instant
Messenger (hence "AlMster") to make P2P mirror the "traditional"
method of sharing music among a circle of semi-anonymous friends.9
AlMster's demise begat software like Grokster and Kazaa, which did
not rely on centralized servers or another service.10 In fact, Kazaa's
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004)
(examining the tension between piracy and intellectual property rights and the effects of
multinational corporations on the lawmaking process); Jessica Litman, The Politics of
Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 314-15 (2009) (discussing various
influences in drafting of copyright legislation). But see Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig's
Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 2305 (2004) (questioning whether the interplay between
copyright industries, lobbyists and politicians really has the "potential to extinguish the promise
of early twenty-first-century advances").
7. Kybt5 Chiho Saibansho [Ky6t6 Dist. Ct.] Dec. 13, 2006, Hei 16 (wa) no. 726, 1229
HANREI TIMES 105 (Japan) [hereinafter Kaneko 1] (translation on file with author), rev'd, Osaka
Kat5 Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 8, 2009, Hei 19 (wa) no. 461 (Japan) [hereinafter Kaneko
Il] (translation on file with author).
8. Indeed, this problem remains unresolved in the United States. See MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (three opinions, including two three-justice
concurrences, leaving unclear to what degree the opinion of the Court regarding reliance on
inducement represented a departure from the standard in Sony); see also infra notes 26-27, 30-
32 & accompanying text (discussing Grokster and Sony in the context of the Winny case).
9. Peter Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright
Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 181
(2007) (describing, how in the wake "of Napster's rise, a clever programmer developed software
to combine AOL Instant Messenger's technology with file sharing"). Use required registration,
though the user name chosen could be a pseudonym. Id.
10. See Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation
Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) ("The [recording] industry's victory
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architecture, based on a series of nodes and supernodes to direct
traffic, resembles that of Skype, the popular Internet telephone
application, with which it shares some of its origins." Interestingly,
like AlMster, Skype allows encrypted file sharing among the
"contacts" users welcome to their list of callers.12
From the copyright industry's point of view, this cycle may look
less like creative destruction and more like constant guerilla warfare.
After all, any innovative gains are hard to see, while file sharing
software may seem to resemble the Hydra, with the industry cutting
off one head, only to see two more spring up. Further, the Supreme
Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.13 complicates matters. Various copyright owners challenged
Sony, maker of the Betamax video cassette recorder on the grounds
that it contributed to copyright infringement by consumers who could
record television programs and movies. 14 The Court ruled that
contributory infringement cases could not proceed so long as the
technology was capable of "substantial non-infringing uses."15 The
rule creates a safe harbor for innovators whose technology might be
misused by others for infringing purposes.16 The rule emphasized the
mere possibility of non-infringing uses, though, leaving industry
representatives with less efficient means to pursue punishment of
actual infringers.17
While the Court has since revisited the Sony rule in MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,18 an earlier challenge to the rule in Sony
in Napster was fleeting as publicity over the issue increased awareness of P2P technology and
users flocked to decentralized networks like Grokster and Kazaa, making the tracking of P2P use
more difficult.").
11. Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2027 n.203
(2006) (observing that "Skype was founded by the makers of the Kazaa file sharing program in
August 2003").
12. How Do I Send Files Using Skype?, SKYPE, https://support.skype.comlen-us/faq/
FA3091/How-do-I-send-files-using-Skype (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) ('You can send files to your
contacts using Skype for free. You can send any size or type of file . . . . All files sent using Skype
are encrypted end-to-end just like Skype-to-Skype calls.").
13. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 442.
16. Id.
17. See Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 400-01 (2003) (criticizing
Sony, stating, "its ruling implies that VCR manufacturers can facilitate any copyright violation
they wish so long as they can prove that VCRs also facilitate some non-trivial amount of
legitimate behavior").
18. 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the
Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology
Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 584 (2008) (observing that "the Court declined to analyze
what the standard for contributory infringement would be when intent to foster infringement
[Vol. 13:4:811814
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is instructive with respect to the problem of punishing contributory
infringement, either civilly or criminally. In In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, copyright holders, based on the infringement of Aimster's
users, sought to enjoin the distributor of software that essentially
created a file-swapping platform by allowing the sending of music as
attachments to instant messages. 19 Judge Posner considered the
difficult question inherent in this kind of punishment in his own
inimitable style:
A retailer of slinky dresses is not guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he
knows that some of his customers are prostitutes-he may even know which ones are.
The extent to which his activities and those of similar sellers actually promote
prostitution is likely to be slight relative to the social costs of imposing a risk of
prosecution on him. But the owner of a massage parlor who employs women who are
capable of giving massages, but in fact as he knows sell only sex and never massages to
their customers, is an aider and abettor of prostitution (as well as being guilty of
pimping and operating a brothel). The slinky-dress case corresponds to Sony ... .
2 0
Posner's analogy, however, is somewhat flawed. File sharing
potentially has social benefits, as the Grokster Court later recognized;
but it seems unlikely the Court will soon affirm faux massage
parlors. 21 A slinky dress does not a prostitute make. In the context of
P2P, the line between faux-massage parlors and dressmakers is not as
well-defined, no matter how slinky the merchandise.
Behind Judge Posner's salacious analogy lies a compelling legal
argument: Punishment for contributory infringement will likely turn
on the knowledge of the alleged contributory infringer. For Judge
Posner, knowledge and financial interest are intertwined. This makes
sense in a business setting; after all, "know your customer" is familiar
business advice. 22 Commercial motive suggests a commonality of
interest between seller and buyer-their transaction leaves both
better off. The judge can thus move from the subjective to the
objective by turning from the actual knowledge of the defendant to the
degree of his or her benefit relative to that of society.
But Judge Posner's insight carries within it an inherent
problem. For the noncommercial contributory infringer, the relative
cannot be shown" and avoided "further guidance on the meaning of [Sony's] 'substantial non-
infringing use"' standard).
19. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
20. Id. at 651 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
21. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 (describing P2P as "innovation having lawful promise").
To be fair to Judge Posner, Aimster predated the Court's opinions in Grokster. Compare Aimster,
343 F.3d 643, with Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
22. See, e.g., SAM CALAGIONE, BREWING UP A BUSINESS 170 (2005) (exhorting
entrepreneurs to "know your customer"); FREEDMAN-SPIZMAN & RICK FRISHMAN, WHERE'S YOUR
WOW? 49 (2008) (quoting Alice MacDougall: "In business, you get what you want by giving other
people what they want.").
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degrees of individual and social financial benefit are difficult to
measure. What if a dressmaker were to donate her slinkiest numbers
or a parlor owner were to provide space rent-free, not for financial
gain, but because they believed that, even if they aided prostitution,
the "nonprostitution" they abetted would be socially beneficial? The
exhortation to "know your customer" assumes a profit motive this
example lacks. While this hypothetical may sound far-fetched, it
closely tracks a situation that confronted Japanese courts.
II. THE WINNY CASE: ISAMU KANEKO AND "VALUE NEUTRALITY"
The Winny Case started simply enough. Isamu Kaneko, a
Tokyo University computer science department researcher, developed
a decentralized P2P anonymous file-sharing program based in part on
prior art, including WinMX. 23 He followed an "open development"
model, in which he would, at no charge, release successive versions of
the product to users, asking them for input on improvements. 24 In
this telling, the story resembles the sort of mass collaboration that has
become a familiar pattern online. 25
But there is a darker version of this story. Kaneko did not
merely direct a collaborative network of programmers working in their
spare time.26 Instead, he distributed Winny through his own website,
announcing new versions and collecting feedback via the anonymous,
and notorious, Internet forum 2Channel (nichanneru).27 In particular,
he made these announcements in a sub-forum dedicated to file
swapping, where many of the participating likely transmitted
23. See Salil K. Mehra, Software as Crime: Japan, the United States, and Contributory
Copyright Infringement, 79 TULANE L. REV. 265, 270-72 (2004) (describing the technology at
issue and the initial arrest).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, ERIC S. RAYMOND'S HOME
PAGE (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar (providing the evolving
contents of what is probably the most influential account of mass collaboration in software
development).
26. Id.; see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (generally describing collaborative
nature of the Internet). But see Jonathan Barnett, The Host's Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in
Platform Markets for Informational Goods, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1687351 (critiquing this account).
27. For a description of 2Channel's mixed reputation during this period, see Salil K.
Mehra, Post a Message and Go to Jail, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 796-97 (2007) (describing the
Japanese view that 2Channel's anonymous posters say unsavory things, but that their
anonymity provides a ring of truth in their opinions). Despite its somewhat unsavory reputation,
2Channel continues to be one of the most visited destinations on the Japanese-language web. See
Minoru Matsutani, 2channel's Success Rests on Anonymity, THE JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20lOO4O6il.html (describing the site as Japan's "largest
online forum" with 12 to 16 million users monthly).
816 [Vol. 13:4:811
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copyrighted works without permission. 28 Indeed, some Winny users
faced charges for direct infringement-and were convicted.
After the initial prosecutions of some direct infringers, the
focus shifted to the creator and distributor of Winny itself. In May
2004, the police arrested Kaneko, 30 and in December 2006, the Kyoto
District Court convicted him of criminal copyright infringement.31 The
Osaka High Court reversed the conviction in October 2009.32 Since
Japanese appellate courts can review not only legal, but also factual,
questions, 33 the high court explained its reversal in terms of the
standard applicable to contributory infringement, as well as the
district court's mistaken application of this standard.
A close reading of the Winny decisions' treatment of Kaneko's
knowledge helps illustrate the dilemma posed by a noncommercial
contributory infringer. Denied the usual analysis of Kaneko's
financial interest and then imputing to him the knowledge of paying
customers, the court had to rely on far more subjective factors:
[I]n a case where this kind of technology is made available externally, the question of
whether the acts of making it available are illegal acts of aiding and abetting [copyright
infringement] must be answered according to such factors as the social context of the
reality of actual use of the technology and the knowledge of that context, as well as the
question of the subjective intent at the time [the technology] was made available.
3 4
Without a profit motive, tying the contributory infringer's intent to
that of the direct infringer requires speculation. All else being equal,
a profit motive tends to sharpen the link between cause and effect. In
its absence, the determination turns on subjective intent and
knowledge of other individuals' likely acts, as well as the possibility
that they may otherwise share aligned interests. The district court
concluded that Kaneko's own expectation of creating a new business
model, notwithstanding any commercial gain, coupled with knowledge
of the wide use of file-sharing software to infringe copyrighted works
sufficed to find sanctionable contributory infringement. 35
28. See Kaneho I, supra note 7.
29. Mehra, supra note 23, at 270 (noting that Kaneko continued to develop the software
after the arrest of several users in Fall 2003 for direct copyright infringement).
30. Id. at 267.
31. Kaneko I, supra note 7; see also John Leitner, A Legal and Cultural Comparison of
File-Sharing Disputes in Japan and the Republic of Korea and Implications for Future Cyber-
Regulation, 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19 (2008) (describing news and academic reactions to
Kaneko's 2006 conviction).
32. Kaneko II, supra note 7.
33. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 145 (1999) ("Because they do not reserve factual issues for the jury, Japanese judges
on appeal review questions of fact as well as those of law.").
34. See Kaneo I, supra note 7.
35. The district court specifically concluded that:
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On appeal, the Osaka High Court adopted a standard that
resembles the Sony rule of "substantial non-infringing use." The
adoption of this rule is rather interesting given that, in the United
States, Grokster had already reinterpreted Sony.36 Instead, the Osaka
High Court described the Winny software as "value-neutral"-similar
to "dual use," a post-Sony term, in meaning, but with overtones of the
familiar, but distinct, U.S. terms "content neutral" and "net
neutrality."37
In addition to echoing Sony, the high court also adopted a more
defendant-friendly standard for treating evidence of knowledge and
intent. In particular, the court concluded that knowledge without
intentional inducement would not suffice to incur liability:
[T]he defendant, at the time he placed and disseminated the value-neutral Winny
software on the Internet, knew of the possibility and the probability that copyright
infringers would come forth, and we find that he understood that, but, since we cannot
find that Winny was offered solely or chiefly to promote online copyright infringement,
we hold that we cannot conclude that defendant['s conduct] meets the standard for the
crime of contributory copyright infringement.
3 8
Upon reconsideration of the district court's legal and factual
conclusions, the high court declined to infer the requisite bad intent
and reversed the conviction. 39 In particular, the Court pointed to
evidence that Kaneko warned users of their legal obligation not to
[I]n this case, where a considerable portion of the files caused to be exchanged using
Winny, etc. placed on the Internet were the subject of copyright, as file sharing [sic]
software including Winny was widely used to infringe copyrights, where it was public
knowledge that Winny provided secure software for filesharing [sic], and under the
situation where actual use was made of the efficient and convenient functionality
provided widely to users, and where the defendant, with knowledge of the state of
actual use of Winny especially and with the expectation of birthing a new business
model, to disseminate on his own web page these types of filesharing software ...
knowing that an unknown large number of people would be able to obtain [them] ...
the defendant's acts in making available these software programs to an unknown
large number of people, can be found to rise to the level of aiding and abetting
[criminal copyright infringement].
Id.
36. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 914, 919, 939 n.12 (2005). It is yet unclear
whether Grokster represents an alteration or a further interpretation of the rule in Sony. See id.
Grokster holds that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties," id. at 919, but further states that
"in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial non-infringing uses" since
"[s]uch a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor," id. at 939 n.12.
37. See Kaneko II, supra note 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. (pointing to warnings from Kaneko that "due to the current situation in which
rightsholders' copyrighted works are illegally circulating without permission, to all those




infringe copyrighted works, and that he stated his intention to develop
further versions of Winny that would allow for tracking downloads
and making royalty payments. 40 The high court ultimately acquitted
Kaneko, thereby allowing him to avoid both a $15,000 fine and the
one-year imprisonment that prosecutors had requested. 4 1
The tension between the district and high court opinions
highlights important problems. First, they raise the issue of "value
neutral" or "dual use" technology. The threshold task of classifying
P2P technology naturally drives the subsequent analysis. Posner
avoided this characterization problem with a hypothetical that cleanly
divides the underlying subject matter into the relatively innocuous
"slinky dress" and the suspicious "faux massage parlor."42 But online
platforms-whether P2P or otherwise-are not so clearly labeled.
Given the potential chilling of future technology with threats of
imprisonment, criminalizing contributory infringement is ill-advised.
In another context, commentators worry about the threat of
civil antitrust cases dampening innovation and dynamic efficiency,
even when the targets of such cases are established corporations with
ample ability to protect themselves through rent-seeking. 43 If Civil
antitrust suits against large corporations are worrisome, criminal
suits against nascent companies should cause even greater concern.
Imagine if the founder of Facebook had been thrown in jail for a short
stint before his idea had taken root.4 4  You cannot, because the
Internet, as it exists in America, ensures that public and private
barriers to disruptive innovation remain low. 45  By contrast, an
established corporate defendant can access the press, lobbyists, and
even the political process to push back against the civil litigation they
face.
40. Id. (stating that, with further development of Winny, "we will move towards having
a system capable of charging copyright fees").
41. Kaneko I, supra note 7. The District Court ordered the fine but not the
imprisonment; while Kaneko appealed his conviction and fine to the Osaka High Court, the
prosecutors also appealed the District Court's failure to order his imprisonment. Kaneko II,
supra note 7.
42. 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).
43. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 915, 919 (2008).
44. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the film The Social Network if the authorities had
hauled off the young antihero for a short jail stint thirty minutes into the movie. See THE SOCIAL
NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010).
45. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Sorkin vs. Zuckerberg, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 2010, http://
www.tnr.com/articlelbooks-and-arts/78081/sorkin-zuckerberg-the-social-network ("Because the
platform of the Internet is open and free, or in the language of the day, because it is a 'neutral
network,' a billion Mark Zuckerbergs have the opportunity to invent for the platform.").
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On the other hand, a rights holder might not believe Kaneko's
warnings and plans for building a royalties functionality into Winny.46
Were these merely attempts to cover himself? The Osaka High
Court's citation of these facts dovetails nicely with Grokster, in which
Justice Stevens held that, absence affirmative evidence of an intent to
induce infringement, "a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative
steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. .. . Such a holding would tread too
close to the Sony safe harbor."47 This passage suggests that Grokster
merely demarcates the line between two types of indirect liability-
contributory infringement (where no substantial non-infringing use
exists) and induced infringement (aiding and abetting). This line may
be clear in theory-but not in practice. Evidence that Winny might
later include methods to prevent infringement, as well as warnings
not to infringe, track this twenty-first century reinterpretation of
Sony. Of course, rights holders could reasonably worry that this safe
harbor effectively immunizes any contributory infringer who is not so
foolish as to exhort users to infringe.
III. THE PIRATE BAY AND BEYOND
Could any contributory infringer be so foolhardy? The very
existence of The Pirate Bay would seem to answer the question with a
resounding "yes."4 8 The sensational Swedish case, with both civil and
criminal charges pending, has not yet reached a final result, but it has
already impacted how P2P is perceived. 49 The defendants operated a
BitTorrent index and tracker that helped users to find torrent files,
often directing downloaders to peers who possess infringing copies of
popular television programs and movies.50 Four defendants (three site
operators and their former ISP's CEO) received one-year prison terms
for contributory copyright infringement, though three had their
sentences reduced on appeal, with that of the fourth still pending.51
46. See Kaneko II, supra note 7.
47. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 n.12 (2005).
48. See THE RESEARCH BAY, http://thepiratebay.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (website
now calling itself "The Research Bay").
49. See, e.g., Michael Carrier, The Pirate Bay, Grokster and Google, 15 J. INTELL. PROP.
RTS. 7, 7 (2010) (observing that the Pirate Bay case provokes "strong reactions," with
'[piroponents point[ing] to a vibrant forum for distributing files" and "[c]ritics lamenting the
massive pirating of copyrighted works").
50. Id.




Whatever the resolution of the Pirate Bay case, it differs from
Kaneko in important ways. First, while the Pirate Bay does not sell
its service directly, the site does host advertising, at least to defray its
costs. 5 2 Second, the site gained notoriety for its famously flippant
attitude towards rights holders. 53 Finally, the trial court found the
defendants to have intentionally created the opportunity for others to
infringe;54 unlike Kaneko, there was no ambiguity on this point, nor
any need to connect dots involving subjective intent, actual
knowledge, and social context.
The Pirate Bay case thus provides an example of a more
commercial and more clearly intentional contributory infringer. The
attitude of its members, coupled with its adoption of piracy as a
metaphor, may make it an attractive target for rights holders seeking
to further leverage U.S. criminal law. Is criminal copyright
enforcement against contributory infringers a realistic possibility in
the United States? After all, the United States has a different history
and legal and social institutions than countries such as Japan and
Sweden; these differences make criminal penalties for contributory
infringement unlikely. Most notably, to the extent that non-infringing
uses of P2P software include citizen expression, criminal penalties for
contributory infringement implicate similar "chilling" concerns that
have led U.S. courts to closely scrutinize state restraints on freedom of
speech.55 Some commentators believe that the Internet may require a
rebalancing of expression versus state restraint,56 but the dangers of
chilling speech, online association, and innovation should be weighed.
In particular, the United States has a highly developed system of civil
52. [Stockholm District Court] 2009-04-17 p.51 B13301-6 (Swed.) [hereinafter Pirate
Bay], translation available at http://www.wired.com/images blogs/threatlevel/2009/04/
piratebayverdicts.pdf (stating that "defendants intentionally brought about the actual
circumstances which constituted aiding and abetting").
53. The site repeatedly would publish online letters from rights holder counsel, followed
by the site operators' taunts, including requests for more correspondence due to a lack of toilet
paper and to be sued in Japan so as to provide the opportunity to visit there. E.g., Email from
Gottfrid Svartholm Warg, Co-Owner, Pirate Bay, to Willoughby & Partners (Nov. 1, 2004),
available at http://static.thepiratebay.org/sega-response2.txt. Additional letters and responses
are available at Legal Threats Against the Pirate Bay, THE RESEARCH BAY, http://the
piratebay.org/legal (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
54. Pirate Bay, supra note 52, at 53.
55. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down prior
restraint injunctions based on asserted national security grounds in Pentagon Papers case);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (striking down Louisiana criminal defamation statute).
But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding injunction
of website's posting of software code that circumvented DVD encryption system based on code's
functional, non-speech aspect in addition to reflecting the programmers' thoughts).
56. See, e.g., THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 6 (Saul X.
Levmore & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2010) (discussing free-speech in the online context).
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litigation with a discovery system already adapted to the Internet
context-so it need rarely turn to criminal enforcement. 7
Nevertheless, several considerations suggest that criminal
prosecution for contributory copyright infringement could develop in
the United States. First, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has already
institutionalized criminal copyright enforcement in a way that
capitalizes on the information provided by rights holders and their
representatives, including the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA).5 8 This enforcement relies on existing statutes and
penalties and targets what DOJ has euphemistically called "the
deterrent effect of prosecution."59 It would not necessarily require new
legislation, new institutions, or a new definition of purpose to extend
that reach.
The pressure to internationalize and harmonize the response to
P2P also increases the possibility of American criminalization of
contributory infringement.60  Such pressure stems, in part, from
overseas prosecutions, such as those of Kaneko and the Pirate Bay. In
addition, powerful producer interests may soon attempt to convince
governments to incorporate criminal provisions in trade agreements.61
57. See Joshua Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music
Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1049, 1079-80 (2008) (describing U.S. courts'
applications of personal jurisdiction concepts in the context of motions to quash subpoenas to
ISPs seeking users' identities); Mehra, supra note 27, at 813-14 (pointing out lower U.S. need to
apply criminal law to online libel because of its that developed civil litigation institutions and
methods).
58. The DOJ now has expert IP prosecutors to implement its IP enforcement strategy;
each U.S. Attorney's Office has Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP)
Coordinators and 25 CHIP units, placed in areas of geographic emphasis and consisting of a
concentration of Assistant U.S. Attorneys focusing on high-tech and IP offenses. Computer Crime
& Intellectual Prop. Section, Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Program, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/chips.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2011). In prosecutions such as Operation Remaster, the DOJ has acted in concert with private
trade associations such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA). Susan Butler, Seizures (Legal Matters), BILLBOARD, Oct.
29, 2005, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/miscellaneous-retail-retail-stores-
not/4555134-1.html.
59. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPRERTY CRIMES 306 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanuallipma2006.pdf,
60. See Nate Anderson, ACTA Draft Leaks: Nonprofit P2PFaces Criminal Penalties, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/actual-acta-draft-leaks-
noncommercial-p2p-could-get-criminal-penalties.ars.
61. See John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Persoahood: User Rights and the IP
(Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (2011) ("[The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement] also empowers customs officers at border crossings to search
laptops, smart phones, and other devices with hard drives-not for detonation devices that might
threaten national security, but for content that infringes copyright law . . . . With the strong
support that ACTA is receiving from lobbying interests acting on behalf of the content-creation
industries, the proposal also raises serious concerns that hard-drive searches will create an in
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The chilling effect of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) had made copyright scholars and Internet
activists wary62 of proposed agreements such as the pending Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which includes provisions
requiring signatory nations to criminally punish contributory
infringement "on a commercial scale," even where done with "no
motivation of financial gain."63
The ACTA has drawn the most fire for the secrecy of its
negotiation, but some observers have been alarmed by its potential
criminalization of contributory infringement for P2P activity, even
without commercial gain.64 The language in the draft that concerns
such observers copies TRIPS language negotiated a generation ago.65
However benign the origin of that text, the same words may come to
mean something different in wired world. Requiring criminal
punishment for contributing to "commercial scale" infringement takes
on new meaning.66 Even absent a profit motive, the reach that the
Internet confers on individuals makes it easier to deem their activity
to be on a "commercial scale."
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the draft form of the ACTA and the incomplete status of
the Pirate Bay case, plus the unprecedented nature of Kaneko, firm
terrorem effect to stifle any manner of unauthorized possession or use of copyrighted content,
whether legitimately excused by law or not.").
62. See Letter from 75 Law Professors to President Barak Obama (Oct. 28, 2010),
available at http://wcl.american.eduipijip/go/academicsO282010 (calling for halt of ACTA);
Sunlight for ACTA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy? cmd=
display&page=UserAction&id=383 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011); see also Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (Proposed Final Draft Dec. 2010) [hereinafter ACTA Draft], available at
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_147079.pdf.
63. See Anderson, supra note 60 (observing that the drafts of the ACTA "include
language that would make copyright infringement on a 'commercial scale,' even when done with
'no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain,' into a criminal matter"). The draft of the
ACTA contains provisions that would require states to criminalize aiding and abetting such acts,
and would thus be relevant to cases such as those of Kaneko and The Pirate Bay. See ACTA
Draft art. 23.1, 23.4 (stating that "[elach Party shall provide for criminal procedures and
penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or
related rights piracy on a commercial scale" and "[w]ith respect to the offences specified in this
Article for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall ensure
that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law").
64. Id.
65. Compare ACTA Draft art. 23, with Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
66. See Anderson, supra note 60.
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conclusions about the impact of criminal prosecution for contributory
copyright infringement would be premature. Even so, given the far-
reaching effects that criminal prosecution could have on technologies
with "lawful promise,"67 it would also be premature to embark on that
adventure without a first debating the potential downsides. At the
very least, where no direct profit motivates the alleged contributory
infringement, it is dangerous to jump to the conclusion that potential
innovation deserves prosecution. As with chilled expression or lost
economic efficiency, we may not fully appreciate what we lose because
it has not yet crystallized-but we will lose it just the same.
67. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005).
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